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Audio Data Verification and Authentication using
Frequency Modulation based Watermarking
Jonathan M Blackledge, Fellow, IET and Omar Farooq, Member, IEEE
Abstract— An approach to watermarking digital signals using
frequency modulation - ‘Chirp Coding’ - is considered. The
principles underlying this approach are based on the use of
a matched filter to reconstruct a ‘chirp stream’ code that is
uniquely robust. The method is generic in the sense that it
can, in principle, be used for a variety of different signal (the
authentication of speech and biomedical signals, for example).
Further, by generating a bit stream that is signal dependent,
chirp coding provides a method of self-authentication, which has
a wide range of applications including copyright protection and
digital rights management. However, in this paper, we focus on
the application of chirp coding for the verification, authentication
and self-authentication of audio signals. We also consider the
effect of using a multi-level chirp coding approach to increase
the ‘volume’ of data that can be embedded into a host signal.
The theoretical and computational aspects of the matched
filter with regard to the properties of a chirp are briefly
revisited to provide the essential background to the method.
Coding and decoding methods are then addressed and the results
of different ‘attack strategies’ considered including Objective
Difference Grades that are evaluated using Perceptual Evaluation
of Audio Quality .
Index Terms— Audio Signal Processing, Frequency Modu-
lation, Chirp Coding, Digital Watermarking, Authentication,
Wavelet Transform.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the increase in computing power and high band-width internet connectivity, copying, editing and the
illegal distribution of audio data has become relatively easy
and common place. This is a problem that is an issue in
the distribution of most data and digital signals and is a
major concern of the multimedia industry, in general. For
this reason, the demand for copyright protection and tamper
proofing of audio data has significantly increased in recent
years and a range of digital audio watermarking methods have
been proposed for applications such as copyright, annotation,
authentication, broadcast monitoring, and tamper-proofing [1]
- [4].
Adding special codes in the file header or embedding digital
watermarks in the data can prevent/detect illegal copying or
tampering. The former technique, however, has a limitation
which is that once the header has been analysed, it can be
easily removed, unlike a watermark that remains with the host
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data and can only be removed at the cost of substantial loss
of information from the data.
An important goal in any watermarking method is to make
the watermark imperceptible so that the end user(s) of the data
is unaware of its presence. This is especially important when
the audio data is music where degradation in quality cannot be
tolerated. Most of the watermarking algorithms developed for
this purpose take advantage of Human Auditory System (HAS)
limitations to embed a perceptually transparent watermark into
the host signal.
A wide range of time domain embedding techniques such
as Least Significant Bit (LSB) alteration [5], Echo Addition
[6], [7], Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) [8] and Spread
Spectrum [9], [10] methods have been attempted together with
transform domain techniques such as Fourier [11], Cepstral
[12] and Wavelet-based ([13], [14] and [15]) approaches. Most
of the algorithms developed fall into the category of robust
watermarking due to their high tolerance toward different
attacks. However, there are some applications where there is
a need for checking the authenticity and originality of audio
data. Such applications occur in areas such as broadcasting and
sound recordings that may be used as evidence, e.g. police
interviews, telephone intercepts and verbal agreements that
are taken to be legally binding. Thus, watermarks for such
applications must be fragile, i.e. the watermark should break
if any tampering is undertaken on the watermarked signal.
It is desirable to have a watermark extraction process that is
‘blind’, implying that the original ‘host signal’ is not required
to extract the watermark. To achieve this, a fixed watermark
sequence can be embedded. However, this decreases the secu-
rity of the scheme since a unique watermark sequence should
ideally be used for a given signal. A solution to this problem
is to use a signal dependent watermark code that can be both
regenerated and reconstructed from the watermarked signal
(implying that the sequence extracted from the original and
watermarked signals are same).
High robustness to attacks along with high data rate wa-
termark embedding cannot be achieved simultaneously [16].
There have been various attempts to increase the payload ca-
pacity for robust watermarking [17] and, more recently, multi-
level watermarking in different domains has been proposed
[18]. In this paper we propose a robust multi-level audio
watermarking scheme based on embedding different frequency
modulated ‘chirp’ signals by exploiting the unique property
of a chirp in that it can be recovered in very low Signal-to-
Noise Ratio (SNR) environments. Further, the HAS limitation
of having poor sensitivity to frequencies below 100Hz can
be exploited. Together with the robustness of the method,
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this approach has the capability of providing multi-level self-
authentication as well and thus, provides a multi-level robust
watermarking procedure with tamper detection capability.
Developing robust watermarking techniques for digital au-
dio signals is relatively difficult compared to watermarking
digital images. This is due to the high sensitivity of the human
ear over a large dynamic range in comparison to the human
eye. In general, the characteristics of the HAS can be utilised
to achieve an imperceptible performance in audio watermark-
ing [19]-[24]. Most of the audio watermarking techniques
use either a frequency domain [25], [26] or time domain
[27], [6] masking property to embed a watermark. In [28],
for example, a spread spectrum technique is proposed that
considers the host signal in terms of a communications channel
through which the watermark is transmitted. In all of these
techniques, the host signal is required to extract the watermark,
which, in many applications, may not be feasible and/or
desirable (depending on the security protocols associated with
a watermarking system). Thus, a blind extraction technique
is usually preferable. In this paper, following an approach
originally developed by Blackledge [29] and developed further
by Blackledge and Farooq [30]-[33], we present a method of
self-authenticating an audio signal and study the robustness of
the technique subject to a range of attacks.
The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry
(IFPI) has set the following requirements on audio water-
marking [19], [16] and [20]: (i) The watermark should be
imperceptible; (ii) the embedding algorithm should give more
than 20 dB SNR with a 20 bps data payload; (iii) the
watermark should resist most common audio processing oper-
ations and attacks, such as digital-to-analogue and analogue-
to-digital conversions, temporal scaling, additive/multiplicative
noise corruption and MP3 compression; (iv) the watermark
should be able to prevent unauthorized detection, removal and
embedding, unless the quality of audio becomes very poor.
Most audio watermarking techniques focus on embedding
watermarks for data verification. The development of fragile
watermarking schemes has not been researched to the same
extent. The main application of fragile watermarking is in the
assessment of authenticity (tamper detection) of the data. In
this paper we propose a frequency modulation (chirp coding)
watermarking scheme which is not only robust but also serves
for the purpose of tamper-proofing through self-authentication.
The advantages associated with the low human ear sensitivity
at low frequencies are taken into consideration to embed low
frequency chirps within the host signal. The watermarking
sequence is derived from the host signal’s sub-band energies
obtained by wavelet decomposition. The sub-band energies are
not changed after watermarking thereby giving the method
the capability of implementing a blind watermark detection
process. For self-authentication the extracted watermark se-
quence is compared to the sequence derived from the sub-band
energies associated with the watermarked signal.
Section II of this paper gives the basic background of
the proposed scheme and Sections III revisits the use of the
match filter for the detection of frequency modulated signals,
i.e. the deconvolution of frequency modulated signals by
correlation. The use of frequency modulation for watermarking
is explained in Section IV and the generation of watermark
sequences based on sub-band energies obtained by wavelet
decomposition is discussed in Section V. Application of the
method for self-authentication is considered in Section VI
and the results of different attacks based on the Perceptual
Evaluation of Audio Quality (PEAQ ITU-R recommendation
BS.1387) [21] measurements are presented in Section VII.
Finally, Section VIII investigates the use of multi-level wa-
termarking with regard robustness and self-authentication.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Methods of watermarking digital data have applications in a
wide range of areas. Digital watermarking of images has been
researched for many years in order to achieve methods which
provide both anti-counterfeiting and authentication facilities.
A principal equation that underpins this technology is based
on the fundamental model for defining a signal and image, in
general, and is given by (e.g. [34], [35])
s = Pˆ f + n
where f is the information content for the signal, Pˆ is
some linear operator, n is the noise and s is the output
signal. This equation is usually taken to describe a stationary
process in which the operator Pˆ is invariant of time and
the noise n is characterized by stationary statistics (i.e. the
probability density function of n is invariant of time). The most
typical operation associated with this model is the convolution
operation, i.e.
s(t) = (p⊗ f)(t) + n(t)
where ⊗ denotes the convolution operation, p(t) is the Impulse
Response Function and t denotes time.
In the field of cryptology, the operation Pˆ f is referred to
as the processes of ‘diffusion’ and the process of adding noise
is referred to as the process of ‘confusion’. In Cryptography
and Steganography (the process of hiding secret information in
images [20]) the principal ‘art’ is to develop methods in which
the processes of diffusion and confusion are maximized, an
important criterion being that the output should be dominated
by the noise n which in turn should be characterized by a
maximum entropy criterion (i.e. a uniform statistical distribu-
tion).
Digital watermarking and Steganography can be considered
to form part of the same field of study, namely, covert
communications. Being able to recover f from s provides a
way of reconstructing the information content of the signal. If
we consider f to be information that constitutes a ‘watermark’,
and n is a host signal (an audio signal, for example, which
is the focus of the work reported in this paper) in which the
watermark is embedded, then our problem is to recover the
watermark from the host signal. If, in addition, it is possible to
determine that a copy of s has been made leading to some form
of signal degradation and/or corruption that can be conveyed
through an appropriate analysis of f , then a scheme can be
developed that provides a check on: (i) the authenticity of the
signal s; (ii) its fidelity [22] and [23].
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Formally, the recovery of f from s is based on the inverse
process
f = Pˆ−1 (s− n)
where Pˆ−1 is the inverse operator. Clearly, this requires
the signal n to be known a priori. If this signal has been
generated by a pseudo random number generator, for example,
then the ‘seed’ (representing a ‘key’ in cryptography) used
to generate this signal must be known a priori in order to
recover the signal f . In this case, the seed represents the
private key required to recover f . However, in principle, n
can be any signal that is considered appropriate for confusing
the information Pˆ f including a pre-selected signal or image.
Further, if the process of confusion is undertaken in which the
SNR is set to be very low (i.e. ‖n‖ >> ‖Pˆ f‖ where ‖ • ‖
defines a norm, e.g. a Euclidean norm), then the watermark
f can be hidden covertly in the signal n provided the inverse
process Pˆ−1 is well defined and computationally stable. In
this case, it is clear that the host signal or image n must be
known in order to recover the watermark f leading to a private
watermarking scheme in which the signal n represents a key.
This data can of course be (lossless) compressed and encrypted
as required. In addition, the operator Pˆ (and its inverse Pˆ−1)
can be key dependent. The value of operator key dependency
relies on the mathematical properties of the operator that is
available and whether it is compounded in an algorithm that
is required to be in the public domain.
Another approach is to consider the case in which the signal
n is unknown and to solve the problem of extracting the
watermark f in the absence of this signal. In this case, the
reconstruction is based on the result
f = Pˆ−1s+m
where
m = −Pˆ−1n
Now, if a process Pˆ is available in which ‖Pˆ−1s‖ >>
‖m‖, then an approximate (noisy) reconstruction of f can
be obtained in which the (processed) noise m is determined
by the original SNR of the signal s and hence, the level of
covertness of the diffused watermark Pˆ f . In this case, it may
be possible to post-process the reconstruction (de-noising, for
example) and recover a relatively high-fidelity version of the
watermark, i.e.
f ∼ Pˆ−1s.
This approach (if available) does not rely on a private key
(assuming Pˆ is not key dependent). The ability to recover the
watermark only requires knowledge of the operator Pˆ (and its
inverse) and post-processing options as required. The problem
here is to find an operator that is able to recover the watermark
effectively in the presence of the signal n. Ideally, we require
an operator Pˆ with properties such that ‖Pˆ−1n‖ → 0.
In this paper, the operator is based on a chirp function.
A ‘chirp’ is a signal which has a frequency sweep which
increases or decreases with time. This increase/decrease in
frequency may be linear, quadratic or logarithmic as illus-
trated by the spectrograms (time-frequency maps) given in
Figure 1. One of the most common chirp signals is a linear
Fig. 1. Spectrograms (time-frequency maps) for three different types of chirp
signal: linear (top), quadratic (centre) and logarithmic (bottom).
Frequency Modulated (FM) chirp which is of (complex) type
exp
(−iαt2) where α is the ‘chirp parameter’. If this function
is convolved with f , then the inverse process can be simply
undertaken by correlating with the (complex) conjugate of the
chirp exp(iαt2). This provides a reconstruction for f in the
presence of noise n that is accurate and robust with very low
SNRs [29]. If we consider a watermark based on some coding
method in which the noise n is the host signal, then the water-
mark f becomes n-dependent. This allows an authentication
scheme to be developed in which the watermark is generated
from the signal in which it is to be embedded. Authentication
of the watermarked data is then based on comparing the code
generated from s = Pˆ f+n and that reconstructed from s when
‖Pˆ f‖ << ‖n‖. This is an example of a self-generated coding
scheme which avoids the use, distribution and application
of reference codes. It is the foundation for the method we
call self-authentication described in Section VI in which code
generation (in this case, the conversion of the host signal to a
bit stream) is based on the application of a wavelet transform.
In practice, the diffusion of a bit stream (represented by
the function f ) by convolution with a chirp function, does not
provide a reconstruction (through correlation with the complex
conjugate of the chirp function) with an accuracy and fidelity
that is viable. To overcome this, we consider a ‘chirp stream’
as illustrated in Figure 2. Here, the operation Pˆ f is replaced
with a chirp stream which, with regard to Figure 2, can be
written as
Pˆ f = cos(αt2)⊗ [−δ(t) + δ(t+ T ) + δ(t+ 2T )− δ(t+ 3T )
−δ(t− 4T ) + δ(t+ 5T )− δ(t− 6T )]
where cos(αt2) ∃ ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. This solution provides a more
accurate reconstruction but at the expense of increasing the
size (the product of the chirp length with the total number of
bits used to represent the watermark code) of the host signal
required for watermarking.
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Fig. 2. Watermark sequence (0110010) and the corresponding chirp stream.
There are numerous applications of this technique in areas
such as telecommunications and speech recognition where
authentication is mandatory. The method can readily be ap-
plied to audio data with no detectable differences in the audio
quality of the data. The watermark code is able to be recovered
accurately and can be ‘engineered’ to be very robust. On the
other hand, the method can be ‘calibrated’ to output relatively
significantly changes if the data is distorted through cropping,
filtering, noise or a compression system, for example, thus,
providing a way of making a signal tamper proof.
III. DECONVOLUTION OF FREQUENCY MODULATED
SIGNALS
The matched filter is frequently used in systems that utilize
linear frequency modulated (FM) pulses known as chirps or
chirped pulses [36], [37] and [38]. Examples of where this
particular type of pulse is used include real and synthetic
aperture radar [39], [40], active sonar and some forms of
seismic prospecting, for example. Interestingly, some mam-
mals (including dolphins, whales and bats) use frequency
modulation for communication and detection. The reason for
this is the unique properties that chirps offer in terms of the
quality of extracting information from signals with very low
SNRs and the simplicity of the process that is required to do
this (i.e. correlation) as discussed below.
The liner FM pulse is given (in complex form for unit
amplitude) by
p (t) = exp
(−iαt2) , |t| ≤ T
2
where α is a constant and T is the length of the pulse. The
phase of this pulse is αt2 and the instantaneous frequency is
given by
d
dt
(
αt2
)
= 2αt
which varies linearly with t. Hence, the frequency modulation
is linear which is why the pulse is referred to as a linear FM
pulse. If p(t) is taken to be the Impulse Response Function,
then the signal s(t) that is recorded is given by (neglecting
additive noise).
s (t) = exp
(−iαt2)⊗ f (t) , |t| ≤ T
2
.
Matched filtering (i.e. correlating the signal s(t) with the
complex conjugate of p(t) where the correlation operation is
denoted by ) we have
fˆ(t) = exp(iαt2) exp (−iαt2)⊗ f(t)
= T exp(iαt2)sinc (αTt)⊗ f (t) , | t |≤ T
2
.
If we now consider the length of the linear FM pulse to be
relatively long (i.e. T >>), then
cos
(
αt2
)
sinc (αTt) ∼ sinc (αTt)
and
sin
(
αt2
)
sinc (αTt) ∼ 0
so that
fˆ (t) ∼ T sinc (αTt)⊗ f (t) .
In Fourier space, this last equation can be written as (ignoring
scaling)
Fˆ (ω) =
{
F (ω), | ω |≤ αT ;
0, | ω |> αT.
The estimate fˆ is therefore a band limited estimate of f
whose bandwidth is determined by the product of the chirping
parameter α with the length of the pulse T.
Given that
s (t) = exp
(−iαt2)⊗ f (t) + n (t)
after match filtering we obtain the estimate
fˆ (t) ∼= T sinc (αTt)⊗ f (t) + exp (iαt2) n (t) .
The correlation signal produced by correlating exp
(
iαt2
)
with n (t) will, in general, be relatively low in amplitude under
the assumption that n (t) will not normally have features that
correlate or ‘match’ those of a chirp. It is therefore reasonable
to assume that
‖T sinc (αTt)⊗ f (t) ‖ >> ‖ exp (iαt2) n (t) ‖
and that, in practice, fˆ is a band-limited reconstruction of
f with high SNR. Thus, using chirps with matched filtering
for the purpose of reconstructing an input in the presence of
additive noise provides a relatively simple and computationally
reliable method of ‘diffusing’ and reconstructing information
encoded in the input function f . The ability for the matched
filter to accurately recover information from linear FM type
signals with very low SNRs leads naturally to consider its
use for covert information embedding. This is the basis for
the chirp coding method discussed in this paper - covertly
watermarking digital signals for the purpose of signal authen-
tication.
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IV. CHIRP CODING, DECODING AND WATERMARKING
We now return to the issue of watermarking using chirp
coding. The scheme of embedding and detecting a watermark
based on frequency modulation is illustrated in Figure 3 and
Figure 4.
Fig. 3. Basic scheme for embedding and detecting a chirp coded watermark.
The model for the watermarked signal (which is real) is
s (t) = chirp (t)⊗ f (t) + n (t)
where1
chirp (t) = cos
(
αt2
)
, | t |≤ T
2
.
The function f(t) is taken to be a sum of delta functions
f(t) =
∑
k
bδ(t+ kT )
whose polarity b = ±1 is used to differentiate between 0 and
12
For the purpose of authenticating the signal n (t), two
basic criterion must be satisfied: (i) f (t) must be a code
that can be reconstructed accurately and robustly; (ii) the
watermarking code should be very sensitive to any degradation
in the signal n (t). The degradation in the signal may be due
to lossy compression, filtering operations, re-sampling etc. To
satisfy the first condition it is reasonable to consider f (t) to
represent a bit stream, i.e. to consider a digitised version of
f (t) - the vector fi - to be composed of a set of elements
with values 0 or 1. This binary code can be generated by
using a key or a set of keys, which, when reconstructed, is
compared to the key(s) for the purpose of authentication of
the data. However, this requires the distribution of the keys
(public and/or private). The code can also represent plaintext
converted into binary form which is the basis for the case
study considered in Section IX. However, we can also consider
a scheme that involves the generation of a binary sequence
using the spectral characteristic of the signal n (t) itself. Once
the binary sequence is generated, chirp coding can be applied
as discussed below.
1The use of a sine function is equally valid.
2For a digital signal, as illustrated in Figure 2, for example, these delta
functions are taken to be Kronecker delta functions - discrete form delta
functions - of unit amplitude.
Fig. 4. Schematic logic for the generation of a watermark sequence based
on the sub-band energies of the input signal.
A. Chirp coding
The purpose of this coding is to diffuse each bit over a
range of compact support. In order to differentiate between 0
and 1 the polarity of the chirp is reversed for 0. Thus, a binary
sequence 101, for example will be transformed into the signal
f(t) given by
f(t) =

+chirp(t), t ∈ [0, T );
−chirp(t), t ∈ [T, 2T );
+chirp(t), t ∈ [2T, 3T ).
where T is the period of chirp. The period over which the
chirp is applied depends upon the length of the host signal and
the length of the binary sequence. In order to avoid aliasing
and interference with the high frequency components in the
chirp stream, a logarithmic chirp is applied. The instantaneous
frequency ω of a logarithmic chirp is given by
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ω(t) = ω0 + 10βt
where
β = log10 (ω1 − ω0) /t1
Here, ω0 is the initial frequency and ω1 is the final frequency
at time t1, the final frequency being greater than the initial
frequency. These parameters are used to generate a low
frequency watermark that is below the frequency range of the
HAS.
B. Decoding
Decoding or recovery of the binary sequence is based on
correlating the watermarked signal with the original chirp
function. This produces a correlation function that either +1
or -1 depending upon the original polarity of the chirp. If the
value is positive then the sequence bit is assumed to be 1 and if
a negative value is obtained then the bit is assumed to be 0). In
practice, however, the correlation function may not be exactly
1 or -1 when reconstruction is undertaken and the binary
sequence is effectively recovered by searching the correlation
function for changes in sign. The chirp used to recover the
watermark must have the same parameters (including the chirp
length) as those used to generate the chirp stream. These
parameters can be used to define part of a private key.
C. Watermarking
The watermarking process is based on adding the chirp
stream f to the host signal n. However, we require that the
magnitude of f is significantly less than n in order that n
is only slightly perturbed by the chirp stream. We therefore
consider the watermarking process to be described by the
‘normalisation equation’
s (t) =
a
b
[
cf (t)
‖f (t)‖∞
+
n (t)
‖n (t)‖∞
]
where the coefficient 0 < c < 1 determines the the SNR (the
chirp stream-to-host signal ratio) of s respectively and where
a = ‖n (t)‖∞
and
b = ‖[cf(t)/‖f(t)‖∞] + n(t)/‖n(t)‖infty]‖∞.
The coefficient a is required to provide a watermarked signal
whose amplitude is compatible with the original signal n. The
value of c is adjusted to provide an output that is acceptable
in the application to be considered and to provide a robust
reconstruction of the binary sequence by correlating s (t)
with chirp (t) , t ∈ [0 ,T ). To improve the robustness of the
reconstruction, the value of c can be increased, but this has to
be off-set with regard to the perceptual quality of the output
and/or the tamper proofing required of the watermark.
D. Wavelet Decomposition
The wavelet transform is defined by (e.g. [41]-[44])
Wˆ [f (t)] = FL (t) =
∫
f (τ)wL (t, τ) dτ
where the wavelet function wL is given by
wL (t, τ) =
1√|L|w
(
t− τ
L
)
.
This transform is essentially a convolution transform in
which w (t) is the convolution kernel but with a factor L
introduced. The introduction of this factor introduces dilation
and translation properties into the convolution integral (which
is now a function of L) which gives it the ability to analyze
signals in a multi-resolution role.
We consider a code generating method that is based on
computing the energies of the wavelet transformation over S
levels. Thus, the signal f (t) is decomposed into wavelet space
to yield the following set of functions:
FL1 (t) , FL2 (t) , ..., FLS (t) .
The (percentage) energies of these functions are then com-
puted as defined by
Ei =
100
E
∫
|FLi (t)|2 dt
where
E =
S∑
i=1
Ei.
Concatenating the binary sequence representation of Ei gen-
erates the watermarking code. The watermark is then chirp
coded as discussed in Section IV(A) with the computations
being undertaken in digital form using a DWT (Discrete
Wavelet Transform). In the study undertaken for this paper,
the wavelets used are Daubechies wavelets.
E. Self-Authentication
By generating a bit stream that is signal dependent we can
self-authenticate the signal. The reason for this is that the chirp
stream can be added to the original signal with such a high
signal-to-chirp stream ratio, that the computation of the energy
values for the watermarked signal remains unaffected. Thus,
once the signal has been watermarked with the chirp stream,
we can apply two separate processes to it: (i) computation
of the bit stream from the (watermarked) host signal; (ii)
correlation of the watermarked signal with the appropriate
chirp to recover the same watermark (bit stream). When both
bit streams are found to be the same, the signal can be taken
to be authentic.
Only a specified segment of the data need be extracted for
watermarking which is equivalent to applying an off-set to the
data. The segment can be user defined and if required, form
the basis for a (private) key system. In principle, different
wavelets can be used for the process of wavelet decomposition
provide the decomposition provide results that are robust with
regard to a specific criterion. The actual wavelet used then
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provides another component that can form part of the private
key needed to extract the watermark. The flow chart of the
proposed watermarking scheme is shown in Figure 5 where
the off-set is assumed to be zero.
The approach considered allows a code to be generated
directly from the input signal and that same code used to
watermark the signal. The code used to watermark the signal
is therefore self-generating. Reconstruction of the code only
requires a correlation process with the watermarked signal
to be undertaken. In other words, the method can be seen
as a way of authenticating data by extracting a code (the
watermark) within a code (the signal) and is consistent with
approaches that attempt to reconstruct information without the
host data [45].
Fig. 5. Flow chart of the proposed watermarking scheme where the off-set
is assumed to be zero.
V. RESULTS OF ATTACKS ON WATERMARKED AUDIO
SIGNALS
Different audio files with sampling frequencies in the range
of 11025Hz to 48kHz were chosen and a (logarithmic) chirp
generated in the frequency band of 1-100Hz for watermarking.
Since the human ear has low sensitivity in this low frequency
band, the embedded watermark is not perceptible. A six-level
wavelet decomposition using a ‘Daubechies 6’ wavelet was
applied on the audio signal giving seven sub-bands. The energy
in these sub-bands was normalized by the total energy of
the signal to give percentage energies in each sub-band as
discussed in Section IV(D). A total of 14 bits was used for
quantization of the percentage energy features, thereby giving
a total of 98 bits to be embedded into the audio signal. When
the watermarking method is aimed at tamper proofing of the
audio data, it is desirable to spread the watermark in which
one bit is embedded per second. Depending upon the band and
amplitude of the chirp, a Signal-to-Watermark Ratio (SWR) in
excess of 40dB can be achieved. Figure 6 shows a segment of
the original and the watermarked signal with SWR of 43.4dB
(calculated for the entire duration of the original signal). For
tamper proofing, the duration of the chirp can be increased to
cover the entire music signal.
Fig. 6. Segment of an original audio signal (left) and a chirp-code
watermarked signal for tamper proofing (right).
In order to detect the effectiveness of the proposed fragile
watermarking scheme, various attacks were simulated and the
watermark recovered. Since an attack changes the distribution
of percentage sub-band energies that are originally present
in the signal, the recovered watermark does not match with
the percentage sub-band energies of the tampered signal. This
results in the ability to detect any tampering in the signal.
The robustness of the chirp-based watermark was also studied
for its application to robust audio watermarking. This was
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evaluated by comparing the original watermark bit sequence to
that extracted from a tampered (attacked) audio signal. Since
the most common attacks are based on filtering, compression,
cropping and noise addition to the watermarked signal, these
attacks were simulated.
A. Additive Noise
Different magnitudes of uncorrelated additive white
Gaussian noise were injected into the watermarked signal
giving various watermarked SNRs. The watermarking scheme
was able to detect tampering (i.e. the addition of noise) even
when the noise was 60dB below the watermarked signal. This
attack was easily detected because additive noise changes
the percentage sub-band energies (even with ‘white noise’
characterised by a flat power spectral density function). If the
noise has uniform density, addition by a constant will change
the percentage energy distribution feature vector causing it to
be easily detected.
For evaluating robustness of the proposed scheme, the SNR
was varied from 50dB to 5dB and the watermark extracted.
The original watermark was detected without any error up to
a SNR of 20dB. However, as the noise power was increased,
error in the detection of the watermark was observed. This
error is plotted in Figure 7 where it can be seen that for a
SNR up to 10dB, the total error in detecting the watermark is
less than 5%.
Fig. 7. Plot of percentage bit error detected in the chirp based watermarking
scheme for different signal- to-noise ratios (SNR).
B. MPEG 1 Layer 3 (MP3) Compression
Watermarking was carried out on a wave file format with
only one channel being watermarked. Experiments were con-
ducted for a wide range of Constant Bit Rate (CBR) and
Variable Bit Rate (VBR) MP3 compression (in the range of
128-320kbps). In all cases, tampering was detected by the
proposed scheme. For the range of bit rates obtained by MPEG
1 Layer 3 compression, all the watermark bits were correctly
recovered, showing the robustness of the technique toward
compression attack.
C. Cropping
Arbitrary samples of the watermarked signal were removed
and watermark detection applied. Since cropping reduces
the energy in some of the sub-bands, tampering was easily
detected when the signal was correlated with the matching
chirp. However, depending upon the length of the crop and the
portion of the signal over which the crop was taken, different
results were observed for robust watermarking. If a crop is
taken from the end of the audio file, then the watermark
prior to this point is detectable. However, if a crop is taken
over portions of the audio file toward the start or over the
central portion the watermarked signal, then the watermark
is not detectable after and beyond the cropped segment of
the signal. This is due to the fact that the offset parameter
changes after cropping and hence, the correlator cannot detect
the watermark.
D. Filtering
Lowpass and highpass filtering was applied to the water-
marked signal and the filtered signal correlated with the ap-
propriate chirp. Tampering was easily detected in all cases. In
the case of highpass filtering, the watermark is itself removed.
Thus, correlating filtered signals with a chirp yields percentage
sub-band energies, which do not match with the watermarked
signal. Figure 8 shows the power spectral densities of the
original, watermarked and the attacked signal using a bandpass
filtering attack. The bandpass of the filter was chosen to be
0.01B to 0.99B where B was the signal bandwidth. Although
there is a very small difference between the watermarked and
the attacked signal, it is still easily detected by the proposed
scheme.
Fig. 8. Difference in the power spectral density of the original, watermarked
and tampered signal. The tampering attack is done by using a bandpass filter
with a normalised lower cut-off frequency of 0.01 and higher cut-off frequency
0.99.
For a lowpass filtered watermark signal, the detected bit
error was less than 1% for a normalised higher cut-off fre-
quency range of 0.01 to 0.99. This shows the effectiveness of
the chirp based watermarking scheme. Even if some of the
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frequency components of the chirp signal are not present in
the watermarked signal, the watermark can still be detected.
However, when using a highpass filter with different cutoff
frequencies, errors are obtained in the detected watermark as
shown in Figure 8. The reason for this error, is that during
filtering, some portions of watermark may be removed while
the signal remains, thereby resulting in erroneous detection.
This problem is absent when lowpass filtering is applied
because it removes the entire audio signal itself along with
some portions of the watermark. Thus the lower frequency
watermark that is left provides a matching ‘signature’ when
correlated with the original chirp.
Fig. 9. Percentage bit error detected in the watermark for different lower
cut-off frequencies of a highpass filter.
It is equally important for a watermarking scheme to be
perceptually transparent along with its robustness and self-
authentication capability. To evaluate this, the watermarking
scheme was applied to different audio files taken from the
Sound Quality Assessments Material (SQAM). These files in-
cluded speech as well as music files. The subjective evaluation
of the watermarked signal showed no perceptual difference
from the original audio signal.
A Perceptual Evaluation of Audio Quality (PEAQ ITU-R
recommendation BS.1387) for the coders has been proposed
[21]. This evaluates a measure called Objective Difference
Grade (ODG) on a scale of -4 to 0 where 0 corresponds to no
perceptual difference. The evaluation can be carried out using
two different models; a basic version and an advance version.
In the basic version of PEAQ (Perceptual Assurance of Audio
Quality), there are 11 model output variables that are combined
with a neural network with 11 input nodes, 1 hidden layer with
3 nodes and a single output [21]. The average ODG using the
basic version of PEAQ was evaluated and found to be -0.2567
for the speech, -1.318 for music, while the overall average
was -0.721 taking all 16 SQAM (Speech Quality Assessment
Material) audio. This shows that the watermarked speech has
imperceptible difference as compared to the original speech.
However it is perceptible for the musical recording used in
SQAM. The main reason for this perception is due to the
TABLE I
SNR AND ODG ACHIEVED FOR DIFFERENT EMBEDDING LEVELS.
Embedding Level Chirp frequency SNR (dB) ODG
range (Hz)
1 0-15 30.9050 -0.46556
2 0-30 28.1748 -0.77894
3 0-45 27.3172 -0.88256
4 0-60 26.7349 -0.95156
presence of large period of silence in the signal during which
the SWR is low.
VI. MULTI-LEVEL WATERMARKING
To verify the multi-level watermarking scheme, audio files
were selected from the Speech Quality Assessment Material
(SQAM) which is usually used for assessing the quality of
speech coders. A logarithmic chirp signal with a frequency
sweep less than 100Hz was used to generate the chirp stream.
This frequency range was chosen to keep the watermarks
imperceptible, wavelet decomposition being carried out using a
‘Daubechies 4’ wavelet. The resultant sub-bands obtained for a
48kHz sampled signal are 0-3kHz, 3-6kHz, 6-9kHz, 9-12kHz,
12-15kHz, 15-18kHz and 18-24kHz. A binary watermark
sequence was derived by representing the percentage sub-band
energies using 12 bits and the total energy by 32 bits, thus
giving a total of 116 bit of information. The coded chirp
was scaled and embedded into the signal. The first level of
watermark was embedded by using a logarithmic chirp with
a frequency sweep of 0-15Hz and a total of four levels of
embedding carried out with the chirp specification as given in
Table I.
In order to analyze the worst case performance, the same
sub-band based watermark sequence was embedded at all four
levels. Further, the length of the chirp and the starting point
for watermark embedding was kept the same at all levels. This
generated overlapping chirp frequency ranges over a common
time frame, thereby giving a maximum possibility for error
during the detection process. Subjective assessments of the
speech quality was carried out by calculating the SNR at
each embedding level. The average SNR was evaluated for
the different levels, the results obtained being given in Table
I. This SNR can be improved if the length of the chirp is
increased. However, it is important to take into consideration
the human hearing curve to interpret the SNR achieved. Since
the human ear has very poor sensitivity below 100 Hz, a lower
SNR is still imperceptible upon listening.
To further verify the above results, tests based on Per-
ceptual Assessment of Audio Quality (PEAQ, Basic) [21]
were also carried out. The PEAQ algorithm is the ITUR
recommendation (ITU-R BS.1387) for perceptual evaluation of
wide-band audio codecs. This algorithm models fundamental
properties of the auditory system along with physiological
and psychoacoustic effects. It uses an original and test signal,
and applies techniques to find difference between them. An
Objective Difference Grade (ODG) is evaluated using a total
of eleven Model Output Variables (MOV) of the basic version
of PEAQ. The original signal and watermarked signal after
different embedding levels was used to evaluate the ODG. The
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results obtained are shown in Table I where the ODG values
mimic the listening test ratings with values between -4.0 (very
annoying) to 0 (imperceptible difference).
Although all the MOVs were calculated from the PEAQ
(basic version), only those relevant to watermarking are re-
ported here. The Noise-to-Mask Ratio (NMR) is an estimate
in dB of the ratio between the actual distortion (caused due
to the embedding watermark in this case) and the maximum
inaudible distortion. The total NMR is the average of the NMR
calculated over all the frames. Negative NMR values indicate
inaudibility whereas values larger than 0dB indicate audible
distortions caused by the watermark. This is an important test
for checking the inaudibility of the embedded watermark at
different levels. The result for speech signals and music signals
were analysed separately and are plotted in Figure 10 along
with the overall average.
Fig. 10. Plot of total Noise-to-Mask Ratio (NMR) for different levels of
watermark embedding.
As stated earlier, although the SNR values (as shown in
Table I) indicate a high watermark level, it is still not audible
because of the low chirp frequencies used. The noise loudness
quantifies the partial loudness of distortions that is introduced
during injection of watermark into the host signal. The root
mean square value of noise loudness has a maximum limit of
14.8197. Figure 11 shows a normalised plot of the average
RMS (Root Mean Square) noise loudness achieved on the
SQAM data for all of the 4 levels of watermark embedding
used.
It is possible for the total NMR to be below 0dB (implying
inaudibility), but there may be a large number of frame with
small positive values and a few frames with large negative
values. This distribution can be observed by evaluating the
number of disturbed frames. A relatively disturbed frame is
one in which the maximum NMR exceeds 1.5 dB and is
expresses a fraction of the total number of frames. The results
in Figure 11 show that at four levels of watermark embedding,
less than 3.5% of the frames have a NMR above 1.5dB. Thus
the multi-level watermarking proposed is imperceptible. To
evaluate the robustness and self-authentication capability of
this multi-level approach, different attacks were simulated as
discussed below.
Fig. 11. Plot of the normalized values of the root mean square noise loudness
(solid bar) and relatively disturbed frames for different watermark embedding
levels.
A. Robustness
To evaluate the robustness of the multi-level watermark-
ing method, correlations between the watermark sequence
(obtained from the sub-band energies of the original signal)
and the recovered watermark (obtained by correlating the
watermarked signal with the appropriate chirp) were carried
out. Different attacks such as the addition of additive white
Gaussian noise, up-sampling, down-sampling, re-sampling,
lowpass and highpass filtering were undertaken on multi-level
watermarked audio data. The tests were undertaken on all the
SQAM files and the average results are reported here. For an
attack using additive noise, it was found that the watermark
embedded using a low frequency sweep was more robust when
compared to a high frequency sweep. The average SNR at
which detection errors start for level-1 embedding was found
-1.9060dB while for level-4 it was 12.14dB. The overall noise
robustness was 13.0376dB which clearly shows that level-4
watermark (sweep from 0-60 Hz) is more sensitive to noise.
Thus multi-level watermarking can help in embedding critical
information using a lower frequency sweep making it more
resistant to attack.
The audio sampling rate was varied from 10% to 200% of
the sampling frequency and watermark recovered at all levels
without any error. Thus, watermark recovery is not effected
by alteration in the sampling rate. Amplitude scaling also has
no effect on watermark recovery provided it is constant over
the entire frequency band.
To simulate a filtering attack, the watermarked signal was
passed through a finite impulse response high-pass filter of
order ‘50 with cut-off frequency of fc. This cut-off frequency
was varied and extraction of watermark carried out until an
error was obtained. It was observed that an error in recovering
the watermark occurred at fc=936Hz. Since a filter has a
smooth transition from stopband to passband, the embedded
chirp stream is not removed but severely attenuated. Since the
chirp stream can be extracted from a high noise background
it is therefore possible to extract the watermark at a high
cut-off frequency. However, appreciable degradation of in
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audio quality occurs using highpass filters with fc=936Hz.
The results obtained are shown in Figure 12. Higher cutoff
frequencies can be achieved if the order of designed filter
is lowered. The scheme is resistant to lowpass filter attack
since the embedded watermark occupies a very low frequency
band. Removing the watermark by lowpass filtering effectively
removes the entire signal along with the watermark. To have
intelligible audio quality, the bandwidth of the lowpass filter
should be at least 4 kHz for which the watermark is fully
recovered without any error.
Fig. 12. Percentage bit error achieved for different cut-off frequencies of a
highpass filter.
B. Self-Authentication
For appraisal of the self-authentication of an audio signal,
two watermark sequences were extracted from the same wa-
termarked signal, the original signal not being required. This
provides the advantage of applying blind signal authentication.
A signal is authenticated if the two watermark sequences
extracted match perfectly. To evaluate this capability, white
Gaussian noise was generated and added to the watermarked
signal which was detectable at a level of about 45.0732dB
SNR. This is because of the change in percentage energies of
the sub-bands as a result of noise addition, even if the noise
is perfectly ‘white’. Further, the total energy also changes
through noise addition. Thus the two extracted watermark
sequences will not match. A lowpass filter with a cut-off
frequency of 23996Hz (which is 99.98% of the full bandwidth)
was designed and the watermarked signal passed through this
filter. Although the signal undergoes imperceptible changes,
because the filtering causes a change in the percentage energy
distribution, the recovered watermark sequences did not per-
fectly match. A difference in 3.83% of bits was found when
the two watermarks were compared. Similarly, a highpass filter
with a cut-off frequency of 3.84Hz was used and 5.23% bits
were found in error. Both filters had finite impulse response of
order 50. Altering the sampling rate also changes percentage of
sub-band energies and is thus easily detected. By re-sampling
at 80% of the sampling frequency a bit error in 16.46% was
observed, while for re-sampling at 120% of the sampling
frequency an error of 14.33% was observed. While keeping
TABLE II
SIGNAL AUTHENTICATION TEST
Attack type % Authentication
bit error test
White noise (SNR=45.0732 dB) 0.59 Failed
Lowpass filter (bandwidth 0-23996Hz) 3.83 Failed
Highpass filter (bandwidth 3.84-24000Hz) 5.23 Failed
Sampling rate conversion (4*fs/5) 16.46 Failed
Sampling rate conversion (6*fs/5) 14.33 Failed
Up-sampling by 2+Down-sampling by 2 4.58 Failed
Down-sampling by 2+Up-sampling by 2 6.90 Failed
the final rate unaltered, the signal was first up-sampled and
then down-sampled. This attack was also detected, the results
being shown in Table II.
VII. CASE STUDY: AUDIO DATA VERIFICATION SYSTEM
The proposed scheme has been implemented using MAT-
LAB to provide a simple tagging facility for (wav or MP3)
audio files. The system designed for this purpose is available
from http://eleceng.dit.ie/arg/downloads/ and is provided by
the file Audio Data Verification.zip. It system has been de-
signed with a view to tagging audio data prior to a download
over the Internet. After installation of the software (which
comes with two tagged MP3 files in the Folder AudioFiles),
the executable file AudioCode provides the interface shown in
Figure 13 which provides the user with the following options:
Name (typically of the user of the data to be downloaded),
Password (defined by the user of the data), Author (typically
of the audio file, for example). In each case, the field length
is limited to eight characters. The fields specifying the date
and time are generated automatically. The I/O data fields and
the accompanying operations Tag, Compress, Show Tag are
specified as shown in Figure 13. There are two principal
operations; those associated with tagging a .wav file and
tagging a MP3 file as discussed below.
A. Tagging a .wav File
The .wav file is selected (through application of Browse) and
the name of the output file specified (typically by Browsing
and then editing the file name as required - the extension is not
required). Clicking on the Tag button watermarks the file with
the information entered by the user. The user has the option
of additionally creating an MP3 file of the watermarked audio
data by clicking on the Compress button.
B. Tagging a MP3 File
The .mp3 file is selected (through application of Browse)
and the name of the output file specified (typically by Browsing
and then editing the file name as required - the extension is not
required). The system automatically converts the mp3 file to
a .wav file for the purpose of watermarking the data. Clicking
on the Tag button watermarks the file with the information
entered by the user. The user then has the option of re-creating
an MP3 file of the watermarked audio data by clicking on the
Compress button.
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C. Data Recovery
The watermarked file is selected through Browse as an
input file (either a .wav or mp3 file). Clicking the Show Tag
button executes recovery of the watermark which reconstructs
the information entered by the user and is displayed in the
appropriate fields - Name, Password, Author, Date, Time.
If the input file is an MP3 file, the system automatically
decompresses the file before extraction of the watermark
as part of the Show Tag option. Assuming that the data
has been watermarked, the information it conveys will be
legible. However, if the data has not been watermarked or has
undergone some form of degradation that is incompatible with
the robustness parameter settings that have been hard-wired
into the system, the information displayed will be illegible.
Fig. 13. Interface for audio data authentication system.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The frequency modulation based watermarking of audio
data proposed in this paper is of specific value for the self-
authentication of the data for which the method is unique. The
proposed scheme has been simulated and tested for various
attacks and has been shown to be robust to some of the
attacks but with the capability to detect tampering of the
signal. This is due to the embedding of a watermark sequence
which is derived using the spectral properties of the signal. The
Objective Difference Grade evaluated using the basic version
of PEAQ with ten model output variables was -0.721 which
is in the imperceptible range.
The multi-level watermarking scheme is found to be robust
to various attacks as reported. Further, it is observed that a
low frequency chirp sweep provides more robustness when
compared to a high frequency sweep. Thus, different levels of
robustness can be achieved. Since the watermark sequence is
derived from the percentage sub-band energies, it is unique and
signal dependent. Due to two different processes associated
with information extraction, an additional advantage of self-
authentication is achieved, thereby making this multi-level
watermarking scheme simultaneously robust and fragile.
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